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Abstract: 
This article analyzes and compares French and U.S. domestic responses to Jihadi 
radicalization, placing particular attention on the similarities between the two. In view of 
the political and cultural differences between the United States and France, the parallels 
between U.S. and French approaches to homegrown Jihadi radicalization are remarkable. 
Both countries got off to a late start when formulating counterradicalization strategies. 
While the underlying reasons (related to, inter alia, the notion of American exceptionalism 
and the French version of secularism) for this differ, the U.S. introduced its first 
counterradicalization strategy in 2011, followed by France in 2014. More important, so-
called “soft” measures (including phone hotlines, dialogues and workshops, vocational 
training, targeted interventions, or counseling and exit programs), adopted by most Western 
democracies in an effort to prevent vulnerable individuals from radicalizing and reintegrate 
foreign fighters and others who have become infected with the Jihadi virus, have taken a 
back seat to “hard” security measures (including surveillance, arrests, and prosecutions) in 
the two countries. These findings have important implications for policymakers. 
Understanding what responses have been formulated, and also why, can facilitate 
international cooperation and provide useful insights on the characteristics, strengths, as 
well as limits of U.S. and French approaches to Jihadi radicals and foreign fighters. 
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American Exceptionalism & French Laïcité 
The U.S. Perspective 
 The 2004 and 2005 terrorist attacks in Madrid and London were remarkably 
different from the 9/11 attacks in the sense that they were carried out by immigrants that 
had spent significant time in Spain, or, in the British case, by British citizens who were born 
and raised in the United Kingdom. Similarly, Mohammed Bouyeri, responsible for killing 
the prominent Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh in 2004, was born and raised in 
Amsterdam. In response, various European countries launched national 
counterradicalization plans, which combined hard security methods (surveillance, 
repression, prosecution, and administrative orders) with softer measures designed to prevent 
individuals from becoming radicalized and participating in violent actions, or rehabilitate 
and reintegrate them.1  
 The response was different in the United States where government officials, like 
then-Secretary of Homeland Security, Michael Chertoff, sounded the alarm about the 
“possibility of Europe becoming a platform for a threat against the United States.”2 
According to this narrative, the more disenfranchised, discriminated, and marginalized 
Muslims of Europe were more likely to resort to terrorism, whereas the well-integrated, 
educated, and economically successful U.S. Muslims were unlikely to attack their homeland 
– as they were mainly occupied with their quest for the American dream, true to the 
manifestation of the melting pot and American exceptionalism. The notion of American 
exceptionalism, a term coined by Alexis de Tocqueville in the 19th century, speaks to the 
unique history, location, make-up, and liberal democratic values of the United States that set 
it apart from (and above) other countries in the world. Consequently, there was a general 
assumption that any terrorist threat came from outside the U.S. and that U.S. Muslims were 
immune to radical ideologies. A 2008 Senate report summarized that Jihadi radicalization 
  
 
 
Dorle Hellmuth: Countering Jihadi Radicals and Foreign Fighters in the United States and France: 
Très Similaire 
3 
Fall/15 
Nr. 4 
ISSN: 2363-9849         
“has been less likely to occur in the United States than in other countries. Some attribute 
this to the unique cultural influence of the “American experience” and the general absence 
of a sympathetic audience in the United States. For the most part, America’s diverse 
Muslim communities are well integrated into our society and want to raise their families in 
safe and peaceful communities. And unlike some countries in Europe …, the “longstanding 
tradition of absorbing varied diaspora populations has protected the United States and 
retarded the radicalization process at home.””3 
 The melting pot tale had real policy implications: It served as a central justification 
for stricter border security initiatives that became an integral element of a counterterrorism 
strategy focused on externalizing the terrorist threat and which include the sealing of U.S. 
borders and accumulation of data on foreign travelers. It also meant that U.S. authorities did 
not consider homegrown Jihadi terrorism a real threat until 2009. As Bergen and Hoffmann 
noted, “The American “melting pot” has not provided a firewall against the radicalization 
and recruitment of American citizens and residents, though it has arguably lulled us into a 
sense of complacency that homegrown terrorism couldn’t happen in the United States.” 
They further admonished that, “By stubbornly wrapping itself in this same false security 
blanket, the U.S. lost five years to learn from the British experience.”4 
In 2011, the White House put forth its first Counterradicalization Strategy.5 This 
policy shift was due to a considerable spike in Jihadi terrorist plots and attacks in 2009 and 
2010. Then-Deputy National Security Advisor, Denis McDonough, echoed Bergen and 
Hoffman’s critique when explaining that, “For a long time, many in the U.S. thought that 
our unique melting pot meant we were immune from this threat (Muslim radicalization)– 
this despite the history of violent extremists of all kinds in the United States. That was false 
hope, and false comfort. This threat is real, and it is serious.”6 More specifically, 2009 saw a 
record of eleven Jihadi-inspired attacks, plots, and overseas training missions, including the 
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Fort Hood, Texas, and Little Rock, Arkansas, shootings and a New York City subway 
bombing plot.7  The New America Foundation counted a total of forty-three terrorism-
related arrests and indictments of U.S. citizens and residents.8  
 Similar to government officials and scholars in Europe, U.S. policymakers and 
academics found that radicals could not be profiled - that there is no one pathway to 
radicalization and that even well-educated, integrated, and wealthy U.S. citizens and 
residents could become radicalized. According to Bergen and Hoffman, “The only common 
denominator appears to be a newfound hatred for their native or adopted country, a degree 
of dangerous malleability, and a religious fervor justifying or legitimizing violence that 
impels these very impressionable and perhaps easily influenced individuals toward 
potentially lethal acts of violence.”9 
 
The French Perspective 
 Like the United States, France also was off to a late start when addressing Jihadi 
radicalization. In fact, until 2014, the French did not consider radicalization a topic that 
ought to be dealt with or one that needed to be tackled by means of special intervention 
initiatives, assistance plans, or rehabilitation programs. The French approach was unique 
among European countries and can be attributed to 1) the French interpretation of 
secularism, laïcité, as well as 2) their unique counterterrorism arsenal.  
 For one thing, counterradicalization models drawn up by many other European 
countries undermine a key pillar and founding principle of the French republic: laïcité, 
France’s version of secularism, does not permit religion in the public domain. In other 
words, “For French counterterrorism officials, setting up formal partnerships with imams 
and community religious institutions is out of the question, just as it is difficult to imagine 
local police-mosque or police-Muslim association collaborations.”10 French authorities also 
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do not differentiate between ethnic or religious communities, as there can be only one 
‘French’ community.11 
 Second, French officials were able to rely on their preventive and tough 
counterterrorism regime which is particularly well equipped to quickly arrest and prosecute 
individuals for terrorism-related crimes. 12 From a French perspective, terrorism-related 
actions constituted a violation of law that was to be treated by means of repressive and 
judicial responses, and not be viewed as the “culmination of” a “radicalization process.” 13 
True to this security-oriented approach, aspiring foreign fighters, their recruiters, and those 
returning from foreign battlefields have been placed under surveillance, arrests, or else been 
subject to interrogations, deportations, and jail time. 14 Focusing on the security aspect of 
terrorism, so Marret also argues, allowed French authorities to sidestep debates about “the 
social-political conditions under which terrorism or political violence can take place.”15By 
doing so, however, France has maneuvered itself into a classic “Catch-22 situation.”16 Even 
though terrorism conviction rates are high, and re-conviction rates considerable with almost 
60% of all prisoners returning to jail within five years of their release,17 prison sentences 
only average seven years.18 That means there is a considerable number of Jihadi prisoners at 
all times, many of whom may be engaged in proselytizing and radicalizing others behind 
bars.    
   
New Counterradicalization Strategies 
The U.S. Approach  
A Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism 
 Formulated in 2011, the White House counterradicalization strategy offers a three-
pronged framework for the protection of the United States, and was supplemented by a 
Strategic Implementation Plan (SIP) a few months later.19 Titled, “Empowering Local 
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Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States,” the strategy emphasizes that 
government authorities can only counter and prevent radicalization in tandem with and by 
empowering Muslim American communities, who know their children, families, and 
neighbors best.20 The focus is on engaging these communities at the grassroots level so they 
build resilience against violent extremism. Second, the strategy calls on the need to build 
government and law enforcement expertise on radicalization. Third, it talks about the need 
to counter radical propaganda, especially online and on social networking sites, by 
promoting U.S. ideals like pluralism and religious freedom. Among the federal government, 
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of Justice (DOJ), and Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) have been most involved in Muslim community engagement.  
 Based on the 2010 recommendations of the Homeland Security Advisory Council,21 
and very much in line with the 2011 strategy, DHS Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) 
objectives have focused on a) supporting local communities, b) supporting local law 
enforcement, and c) understanding violent extremism. While DHS is careful to note that 
the department focuses on all forms of radical extremism, “regardless of ideology,”22 DHS 
engages American Arab, Muslim, South Asian, Middle Eastern, and Sikh communities in a 
number of ways. Under the umbrella of the Building Communities of Trust (BCOT)23 
initiative, and working at times together with the FBI, DHS has been setting up of new 
communication networks and regular community roundtables, to help educate community 
members about government policies and civil rights, while also taking note of community 
concerns and grievances. DHS community outreach is led by the Office for Civil Rights 
and Civil Liberties (CRCL). CRCL is also in charge of the Incident Communication 
Coordination Team (ICCT), a conference call mechanism for community leaders and 
federal officials in case of emergencies.24 Together with the National Counterterrorism 
Center and local law enforcement and community leaders, DHS regularly stages 
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Community Resilience Exercises (CREX) that focus on violent extremist and foreign fighter 
scenarios.25 Ongoing exchanges with vulnerable communities may also include discussion 
about foreign fighters, or how to support people in conflict zones without committing 
crimes.26 As part of a second objective, DHS supports local law enforcement through 
training, workshops, curriculum development about CVE, community policing and public 
awareness campaigns, such as the Nationwide Suspicious Report Initiative. DHS is also 
working with state and urban area intelligence Fusion Centers; created as “analytic hubs,” 
they are designed to bring together local police, frontline personnel, and federal DHS and 
FBI detailees to analyze and share threat information.27 Finally, DHS has been researching 
and compiling information about the radicalization process, community policing, as well as 
disseminating this expertise across all levels of government.28 In early 2015, the White 
House further announced the appointment of a senior level, full-time CVE Coordinator at 
DHS.29 CVE Coordinators have existed since 2010, but thus far served in dual-hatted, part-
time positions. In June 2015, the Homeland Security Committee in the House of 
Representatives went a step further and introduced a bill to create an Office for Countering 
Violent Extremism inside DHS; however, the bill has little chance of passing.30 
 The Department of Justice has emphasized the role of the United States Attorneys, 
as “the nation’s principal litigators under the direction of the Attorney General,”31 in federal 
engagement efforts; interestingly, the SIP also assigns them a lead part as U.S. Attorneys are 
“well-placed to help shape and drive community engagement in the field.”32 Federal 
prosecutors have been meeting with Muslim, Sikh, and Arab communities regarding 
specific local situations and issues.33 Because issues oftentimes involve civil rights and 
backlash-discrimination (defined as bias crimes against members of above mentioned 
minority groups), the department’s Civil Rights Division is in charge of bimonthly meetings 
that also include other federal agencies.34 DOJ’s Community Relations Service has sent out 
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conflict resolution specialists in response to more than fifty backlash incidents. Between 
2012 and 2014, according to then-Attorney General, Eric Holder, “U.S. Attorneys have 
held or attended more than 1,700 engagement-related events” in their respective 
jurisdictions. 35  Events may include “annual dinners, mosque openings, lectures and town 
hall meetings (and) conferences to promote cultural understanding between law 
enforcement and Arab, Muslim, and Sikh-Americans.”36 
 In addition, the FBI has created community outreach programs for each field office, 
most of which also feature permanent Councils with community leaders, Community 
Relations Training Programs (CREST), and Adopt a School /Junior Special Agent 
programs, 37  where FBI agents partner with schools in often “tough” neighborhoods to teach 
them about becoming law abiding citizens.38 The goal is to build trust and permanent 
communication channels. This is of particular interest because the FBI is arguably the 
agency with the largest presence in local communities, with fifty-six field offices and 104 
Joint Terrorism Task Forces across the United States. FBI agents also join U.S. attorneys to 
“explain the legal implications of joining foreign conflicts.”39 In addition, the FBI has set up 
a Specialized Community Outreach Team (SCOT) of language and culture experts who 
approach specific Muslim, South Asian, and Sikh communities for outreach, for example, 
cities with large numbers of al-Shabaab recruits.40  
 Local police, especially those in cities and states with large Muslim concentrations 
(for example, New York City, NY, Dearborn, MI, Los Angeles, CA, Paterson, NJ, and 
Philadelphia, PA), also have specialized engagement units. Among the over 17,000 law 
enforcement agencies in the U.S. involved in counterterrorism,41 New York’s Police 
Department Intelligence Unit is considered particularly experienced in outreach, 
radicalization detection, and community policing, as is the County Sheriff Department’s 
Muslim Community Affairs Unit in Los Angeles.  
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 In 2014, Eric Holder announced that the Department of Justice would partner with 
the White House, the Department of Homeland Security, and the National 
Counterterrorism Center to start a new set of CVE pilot programs across the United 
States.42 This initiative is of particular note because it represents an outreach effort 
involving the main federal actors in addition to various non-security community 
representatives at the local level, including “local government, law enforcement, mayor’s 
offices, the private sector, local service providers, academia, and many others.” 43 Boston, 
Los Angeles, and Minneapolis/St Paul were selected due to their prior experience with 
community engagement and radicalization. The three city pilot produced three distinct 
frameworks that were introduced in February 2015.44 While it is unclear to which extent 
these frameworks will be implemented, Minnesota received a first federal grant in 
September; it will be administered and distributed by a local non-profit organization, and 
will be used, for example, to support mentoring and career services programs for young 
Somali Muslims.45 
 The White House counterradicalization strategy has been criticized, inter alia, 
because the selection of Muslim partners - a critical element of the engagement pillar - 
remains flawed. Critics maintain that Muslim partners often are not representative of 
Muslim communities but leaders of organizations with a nation-wide presence; they are 
frequently self-appointed and have own agendas.46 Others have warned of “significant 
challenges in the development of programs that foster substantive relationships rather than 
token discussions of community relations events.”47 Yet others question whether either 
document resembles much of a strategy.48 Most important, critics argue that local and 
federal efforts lack coordination. While the SIP references a loose DOJ- and DHS-led 
National Task Force that was created to help coordinate efforts at the national level, the 
Task Force includes any and all departments and agencies engaged in community 
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outreach.49 However, there is no lead agency responsible for overseeing the strategy 
objectives and numerous SIP initiatives, to compare and share best practices, or track 
funding and the effectiveness of measures.50 There is also no plan to “reduce redundancies 
and turf wars among various agencies, and provide accountability.”51 Apart from 
bureaucratic rivalries between the FBI and DHS and other federal actors, there are cultural 
differences between federal and local law enforcement agencies. In addition to coordination 
dilemmas and accountability vacuums, intergovernmental information sharing traditionally 
has been cumbersome. Some caution that there should not be one agency in charge, because 
“no organization within the U.S. government has all of the tools necessary to effectively 
counter radicalization.”52 There seems to be a lot of agreement over the need for a whole-of-
nation approach at the grassroots level; the question remains whether there is a need for 
more centralized oversight and steering.  
 To be sure, the U.S. approach as represented in the strategy is decentralized and 
hands off, and does not go as far as the national plans many European countries have 
formulated, including France. The strategy is unclear about how the government will 
counter extremist ideas and narratives.53 The SIP merely comments on the “nascent” 
efforts, which in 2010 focused on National Counterterrorism Center Community 
Awareness Briefings (CAB) about Jihadi recruitment methods and future research plans 
involving best counter-narrative practices and collaborations.54  
 Research and community engagement (designed to empower local actors to help 
themselves guard against radicals) have represented the main bulk of U.S. soft measures, 
with a few recent exceptions. There is no national effort to deradicalize those with radical 
views and violent tendencies at the grassroots level or prevent radicalization from 
happening in the first place.55 A Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report notes that, 
“there appears to be little federally driven guidance to community groups on how to 
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intervene with people vulnerable to radicalization.”56 The report further comments that 
“the SIP itself does not offer any formal means for federal, state, or local enforcement to 
cope with radicalizing individuals outside their traditional areas of expertise - investigation, 
arrest, and prosecution,” and also does not provide any guidelines for handing them over to 
community intervention, so that police end up confronting radicalized individuals only once 
they turn to violence.57 Similarly, the White House emphasized community-led 
intervention at the 2015 CRE summit, but defined it as an effort designed to disrupt “the 
radicalization process before an individual engages in criminal activity.”58 (emphasis added)  
 According to the White House strategy, the United States also “must use a wide 
range of good governance programs - including those that promote immigrant integration 
and civic engagement, protect civil rights, and provide social services,” to prevent 
radicalization. “This necessitates a whole-of-government approach, based on the expertise 
of our traditional national security departments and agencies, as well as other parts of the 
government, including those with experience in addressing community safety issues.” The 
SIP adds that “agencies such as EDU (Department of Education) and HHS (Department of 
Health and Human Services), which have substantial expertise in engaging communities 
and delivering services, also play a role.”59 This “whole-of-government” objective does not 
yet translate into a holistic approach in practice, however, as members of the law 
enforcement and/or judicial community remain the central actors involved in community 
outreach. A CRS report further draws attention to the fact that SIP efforts designed to 
improve radicalization expertise are security-centric, cautioning that “if the SIP’s efforts to 
improve law enforcement training mostly enhance the ability of police to detain suspects 
and provide no others means for coping with radicalization, then these elements of the 
strategy might be better described as counterterrorism in nature, not part of the nation’s 
counter-radicalization strategy.”60 As much as there is a focus on community engagement 
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and trust-building, the key actors, the FBI, DHS, and local police, arguably represent 
security interests and are primarily concerned with collecting information to prevent acts of 
terrorism.61 It goes without saying that there is an inherent tension between community 
outreach and traditional law enforcement activities.62  
 Deradicalization programs have played a prominent role in many Western states, 
such as Great Britain, the Netherlands, Denmark, or Germany. Targeted interventions, 
phone hotlines, vocational training and education, counseling and exit programs are 
considered vital instruments in reintegrating and rehabilitating individuals. They have also 
gained prominence in non-Western countries, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan, or 
Algeria, where “state-directed efforts to change “hearts and minds” have led convicted and 
suspected terrorists to express remorse, repent, recant their violent ideologies and re-enter 
mainstream politics, religion and society. Efforts include religious (re-)education by 
respected clerics, psychological counseling, community and family involvement, vocational 
training, and engagement…”63 For the first time, the 2014 European Union 10-point action 
plan for countering radicalization and violent extremism recommended “dis-engagement 
and de-radicalisation support programmes … (“exit strategies”)” for every EU country.64 
The British Channel program, implemented as part of the CONTEST strategy Prevent 
strand (preventing terrorism by addressing the factors that produce radicalization) first 
introduced in 2003 and subsequently revised in 2009, is among the most prominent. The 
local multi-agency program relies on community leaders and organizations, public 
authorities, and law enforcement to identify vulnerable individuals who are moving toward 
violence. It is coordinated by the police and stages local interventions which may involve 
religious leaders, family members and police, followed by long-term mentoring of youth 
workers.65 Considered most ambitious in terms of its inclusiveness, the Danish city of 
Aarhus has created a program which rehabilitates returning
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employment and education opportunities, free psychological counseling and treatment for 
injuries.66 In Germany, phone hotlines and family counseling centers are available at the 
state and federal levels. Various countries, including Norway, Sweden, and Germany, have 
introduced formal exit programs, which concentrate “on practical and economic assistance 
in connection with exit, on psychological counselling, as well as assistance with forming new 
social ties outside the extremist group.”67 In comparison to non-Western programs in South 
Asia and the Middle East, European programs focus less on religious re-education and/or 
ideology.  
 In this context, a discussion of the varying definitions and understandings of 
radicalization appears in order. Is radicalization about words or actions, or the combination 
of both,68 do the two always go together, are radical ideas and ideologies seen as a precursor 
for carrying out terrorist attacks? In 2011, Coolsaet referred to radicalization as “ill-defined, 
complex and controversial.”69 Sedgwick called the concept of radicalization a “source of 
confusion,”70 due to the many definitions that exist and its context specificness, as the 
concept may be used in the security, integration and foreign policy realm, all of which come 
with different agendas.   
 The 2008 European Commission Expert Group also took note of violent 
radicalization as a “context-bound phenomenon par excellence;”71 not all radicals engage in 
violent actions, some may simply condone violence.72 The few that do turn to violence 
belong to an “enabling environment” that shares a sense of injustice, in addition to personal 
experiences and ties that will trigger radicalization. The “gradual or phased process” of 
violent radicalization can be individual or involve a group setting.73 In the context of group-
level radicalization in Europe, Daalgard-Nielsen has drawn attention to social movement 
theory and network theory in an effort to explain political mobilization within groups and 
social networks leading to violent radicalization.74 By contrast, psychodynamic, cognitive, 
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and identity forming approaches focus on attitudes, thoughts and character traits of 
individual radicalization.75 Regarding individual-level motivations, various empirical case 
studies have produced highly detailed and nuanced accounts of radicalization processes.76 
Finally, sociological explanations focus on structural factors such as political, economic, and 
social grievances, as well as globalization leading to lost and confused identities that 
“struggle with modernity and life in Western democracies.”77 
 While there is no doubt that radicalization is difficult to define, remains in the eye of 
the beholder, and is subject to different societal interpretations, values, and norms,78 
policymakers and scholars usually agree that it involves a process over time. Neumann 
summarized that “radicalization can be defined as the process whereby people become 
extremists.”79 Ranstorp emphasizes the need to understand violent radicalization as a 
process and in context.80 According to McCauley and Moskalenko, radicalization is the 
“development of beliefs, feelings, and actions in support of any group or cause in conflict.”81 
Daalgard-Nielsen defines it as a “process in which radical ideas are accompanied by the 
development of a willingness to directly support or engage in violent acts.”82 Bjelopera 
describes radicalization as “the process of acquiring and holding radical or extremist 
beliefs.”83 The White House Counterradicalization Strategy refers to those individuals who 
become “radicalized to support or commit acts of ideologically-inspired violence.”84 The 
French Parliamentary Commission Report on Deradicaliation defined radicalization as “the 
process of becoming more fundamental … when ideology and violent actions are coupled.”85 
Prominent models designed to capture the evolutionary process include Moghadam’s 
staircase,86 the NYPD’s four phases,87 McCauley and Moskalenko’s pyramid and pathways 
to violence,88 or the various conveyor belt processes introduced by Glees and Pope89 and 
Baran.90  
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 When comparing radicalization leading to violent as opposed to nonviolent behavior, 
Bartlett and Miller argue that the process is really about the adaptation of radical belief 
systems -  however, not all radical thoughts will translate into radical actions.91 Horgan 
reminds us that there will always be “far more radicals than terrorists,” but not all violent 
extremists hold strong, extreme beliefs.92 Reinares et al. agree that “only a small number of 
radicals become terrorist extremists.”93 Borum argues that “Most radicals did not (and do 
not) engage in terrorism, and many terrorists did not (and do not) “radicalize” in any 
traditional sense.”94 The question of how people are radicalizing is just as important, 
therefore, as the question of why they are radicalizing. “Although it is agreed that not all 
radicals are terrorists,” Sedwick notes that the dynamic between radicalism and violence is 
also unclear. Specifically, can and should radicalism that does not lead to violence, or only 
indirectly, be considered a threat?95 This question is very much related to the 
aforementioned relationship between radical ideas/ideologies and behaviors, and comes 
with important policy implications for France and the United States (discussed below). To 
provide another example, in various European countries it is connected to the question of 
whether political Salafists should be considered partners or closely watched. While German 
authorities have refused to work with political Salafists, arguing that they provide an 
ideological breeding ground for violent Jihadist radicalization, the British government until 
2011 considered them important partners with “street credibility” in preventing violent 
radicalization.96  
 The process of “disengagement” from terrorism, to add yet another ill-defined 
concept to this discussion, takes this distinction into account as well, if only indirectly. 
While deradicalization seeks to address and dispose of radical thoughts and/or violent 
behavior, and counterradicalization is looking to prevent radical ideas and/or violent actions 
from emerging in the first place, disengagement focuses on ceasing violent behavior - 
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without changing radical thoughts. Gunaratna et al. see disengagement as a necessary 
condition for ideological deradicalization.  Horgan, by contrast, distinguishes between 
psychological and physical disengagement, while questioning its connection to and the 
validity of deradicalization altogether.97 Omar Ashour refers to ideological, behavioral and 
organizational levels of deradicalization, which can be occur altogether or in different 
combinations.98 The aforementioned European exit programs use behavioral 
disengagement as “key indicators of success.”99   
 Summing up, the relationship between radical ideology and violent behavior is, at 
best, far from clear, highly complex, and also context- specific. Calling the relationship 
between ideology and behavior “untidy,” Snow’s discussion of ideology and the role it plays 
in the emergence of social movements and collective action frames is indicative of this as 
well.100 Snow challenges the assumption that social movement activities are structured and 
fueled by ideology alone or even predominantly. According to Snow, ideologies are neither 
cohesive nor integrated sets of values or belief systems (but often represent contradictory or 
conflicting strands); the ideological diversity among participants is often underestimated 
(they come from all different backgrounds and motivations); corresponding ideologies and 
behaviors are overestimated (he refers to the discrepancy between ideological beliefs and 
real life practice); and collective action frames are not merely derived from ideologies 
(ideology may not play a role or work in tandem with other, e.g. cultural factors).101  Horgan 
goes further than most by arguing for a “clearer focus on behavior” rather than ideological 
change.102 Similarly, Borum postulates that “Adherence to radical beliefs is not irrelevant to 
countering terrorism… but fanatically embracing an ideology is neither a proxy for, nor a 
necessary precursor to, terrorism. Conflating the two concepts undermines our ability to 
effectively counter either of them.”103 It would appear that it remains important to study 
both, in tandem and separately. While a causal relationship between radical views and 
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violent behavior has not been proven it does exist in a number of cases. At the same time, 
non-ideological pathways to violent radicalization warrant examination and attention. 
 When discussing soft measures aimed at deradicalization, a few recent U.S. efforts 
are of note. In January 2015, a Minnesota judge decided to send Abduallahi Yusuf, a 
teenager who attempted to join ISIS, to a halfway house during his sentencing phase. Yusuf 
could only leave the house to meet with attorneys, federal authorities, or religious scholars. 
He was supervised by a nonprofit civic engagement organization, Heartland democracy, 
and regularly met with a history teacher and mentor, who encouraged him to read and 
discuss handpicked articles, poems, and books on identity and values.104 The test case was 
closely watched in other parts of the nation but appears to have gone awry, as Yusuf was 
sent back to prison due to security concerns. In the United States, a country considered 
more violent than many other Western nations, 105 judges and prosecutors are often elected 
on promises of tough justice and law and order measures; detention and long jail times are 
considered crucial for keeping law abiding citizen safe as well as deterring would-be 
criminals. Apart from security risks and litigation concerns, soft measures often include an 
ideological component that is also considered controversial in a country where the 
government, let alone law enforcement, does not interfere with religious matters and the 
first amendment (freedom of speech) remains untouchable. Be that as it may, local and 
federal authorities in the U.S. seem to have started looking for alternatives to long prison 
sentences,106 as “the status quo for either doing nothing with radicalized individuals or 
locking them away for 25 years is untenable.”107 In July 2015, the FBI’s Denver field office 
worked with religious leaders and the parents of Shannon Conley to prevent the teenager 
from joining ISIS.108 These targeted interventions are still considered very much 
improvised, but may represent the beginning of a more mainstream trend. Interestingly, the 
Boston, Los Angeles and Twin City frameworks also talk about the need for intervention 
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programs.109 However, “failure associated with … (the Minnesota trial run),” so John 
Horgan cautions, “will inevitably be used to discourage future efforts.”110   
 
Hard Security Measures 
 Tough measures against violent extremists in the United States include surveillance, 
repression, and prosecution, designed to put individuals behind bars as quickly as possible. 
This is facilitated by a law enforcement and domestic intelligence arsenal that was 
strengthened after 9/11, most notably the Patriot Act and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Acts (FISA) reforms.111 Some of the more prominent Patriot Act tools included and/or 
lowered the hurdles for so-called administrative subpoenas (without court approval) for the 
collection of “transactional data,” “sneak and peak” search warrants for businesses and 
homes with delayed notice, “roving wiretaps” (that apply to all communication devices of 
terror suspects), and access to tangible items (including documents, books, records, and 
papers) “in connection with” terrorist investigations. The legal requirements for FISA-
authorized wiretap and search warrants were significantly lowered to facilitate domestic 
surveillance operations – the 4th amendment prohibits spying on Americans and requires 
either a criminal probable cause hurdle or else proof of a foreign intelligence/national 
security threat.  Last but not least, the Patriot Act was designed to break down the “wall” 
between law enforcement and intelligence operations and information sharing. Since 2011, 
various NSA surveillance programs, at times bypassing warrant application procedures that 
involve the FISA court, have targeted domestic and international phone and internet 
communications of people inside the United States. Even though the U.S. does not have a 
domestic intelligence service, the FBI has been looking to change its ways to a more forward 
thinking, intelligence-oriented agency. It formed the National Security Branch and adopted 
the “preventive paradigm” starting in 2005, in an effort to improve evidence collection to 
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help uncover the next plot rather than close the next criminal case.112 A range of charges 
have been used against individuals suspected of becoming foreign fighters, including the 
“Conspiracies within the United States to engage in violence against people or property 
overseas (18 U.S.C. § 956); Acts of terrorism and violence, including use of “destructive 
devices”, overseas (e.g. 18 U.S.C. § 2332a, 2332b, 2332f); … (and) Receiving military-type 
training from a foreign terrorist organization (18 U.S.C. § 2339B).”113 In addition to these, 
the material support clause has arguably been most prominent and useful in prosecuting 
terrorist suspects. “Providing material support to commit or prepare for a range of specified 
violent and terrorist crimes,” (18 USC § 2339 A) as well as providing material support to a 
foreign terrorist organization are prohibited and punishable by law (18 USC § 2339 B).114 
Material support or resources may refer to any property or service, illustrating a wide range 
of possible legal interpretations. According to former Attorney General Holder, the material 
support act “bars not only contributions of personnel, cash, weapons and other tangible aid 
to designated terrorist organizations, but also intangible means of support – such as training, 
service, and expert advice or assistance.”115 Prison sentences, especially when considering 
French jail terms averaging seven years, are comparatively long, with terrorist plotting and 
foreign fighter-related convictions carrying up to thirty-five and eleven year sentences 
respectively.116 
 Another prominent investigative tool involves the use of so-called Al Capone 
methods - arresting individuals on lesser, non-terrorism charges, such as tax, immigration, 
traffic violations, or lying to an FBI agent.117 Because U.S. law enforcement are restrained 
by freedom of speech protections, FBI agents are also proactively engaged in so-called sting 
operations: They serve as agent provocateurs who encourage terrorist suspects, including 
potential foreign fighters, into taking action in order to arrest and prosecute them. The focus 
on sting operations is representative of what Neumann has called the Anglo-Saxon 
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approach to radicalization, as opposed to the European practice that also pursues cognitive 
radicalization. While the French approach is more security-centric than that of other 
European countries, France has also started to embrace the European focus on countering 
radical ideas.118 Sting operations are a central element of the Anglo-Saxon school because 
the latter only targets behavioral radicalization. The European approach is more far 
reaching, as authorities directly go after ideological breeding grounds.  
 The difference in approaches is directly connected to the question of how 
radicalization should be defined and understood, as discussed above. While the European 
school views radical thoughts and opinions as a threshold for government intervention, the 
Anglo-Saxon threshold is higher as it involves violent acts. According to Neumann, “from 
this perspective, freedom of speech is near absolute, and people’s political views—however 
extreme, anti-democratic, offensive or divisive—are none of the government’s business as 
long as they are expressed peacefully and do not inhibit others’ rights to do the same.”119 
Accordingly, the White House Strategy makes reference to the U.S. constitution which 
“recognizes freedom of expression, even for individuals who espouse unpopular or even 
hateful views.”120  It must also be noted that the “emphasis on illegal behavior … helps the 
authorities to avoid any suspicion of political bias,”121 whereas a focus on radical opinions 
may be interpreted as wanting to suppress political dissent or infringing on freedom of 
speech. As it turns out, however, radical thoughts do become the government’s business in 
the U.S. context as well. It bears mentioning that the government does not merely stay put 
as law enforcement identifies those with radical views but instead encourages them to take 
further steps toward violent action. “From the FBI’s perspective, the lack of instruments for 
dealing with radicalization short of actual terrorist plotting, and the potential risk involved 
in allowing cognitively radicalized people to roam free, leaves law enforcement with no 
choice but to ‘create’ illegal behaviours where none had previously existed,”122 so they can 
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be arrested and prosecuted. This arguably controversial practice123 typically involves 
undercover agents who pretend to be members of or connected to terrorist organizations and 
encourage them to put their radical ideas into practice by offering financial and material 
support. As counterradicalization becomes about preventing people from breaking the law, 
even if police have to provoke individuals into violent action, law enforcement becomes 
invaluable in stopping it, representing the default response. Countering radical ideas, 
however, is a job that cannot be done by law enforcement alone but requires non-security, 
political, and social efforts that are long-term and involve the whole society.124 
   
The French Approach to Jihadi Radicalization 
The Counterterrorism Apparatus 
 Similar to the security-centric approach in the U.S., the French way of countering 
radicals emphasizes surveillance, repression, and prosecution. This is in large part due to the 
aforementioned counterterterrorism regime, which prominently centers on the anti-
terrorism magistrates (juge d’instruction) and their close relationship with the domestic 
intelligence service, the Directorate of Territorial Surveillance, DST (Direction de la 
Surveillance du Territoire)125. As it is comparatively easy to arrest people preventively on 
terrorism-related charges and put them behind bars, radicalization until recently was not 
considered an issue that required separate attention, ideological debate, or the introduction 
of soft measures. French counterterrorism institutions date back to a 1986 reform, which 
centralized counterterrorism investigative powers in the hands of seven anti-terrorism 
judges. In theory tasked with conducting impartial investigations to determine whether 
judicial measures should be taken, in practice their authorities allowed them to “act like 
prosecutors but have the powers of judge.”126 Their substantial counterterrorism arsenal 
includes the power to examine evidence, detain terrorist suspects, and authorize search 
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warrants, subpoenas, and wiretaps.127 In order to utilize the wide range of tools at their 
disposal, the small office of magistrates teamed up with the sizable DST whose agents were 
eager to expand their standing and preventive arsenal. While terrorism offences come with 
more severe penalties and judicial procedures, the French regime was further strengthened 
by a 1996 act that criminalized the mere ‘conspiracy to commit a terrorist offense.’ This 
preventive mechanism enables the prosecution of criminal activities as terrorist acts and has 
been at the heart of the French counterterrorism effort, where the “barrier between 
prevention and punishment is not airtight.”128    
 The French government continued strengthening and adjusting counterterrorism 
authorities and institutions after 9/11 as well, further enhancing data and intelligence 
collection, interagency coordination, and information sharing capacities. These reforms are 
all the more remarkable since the French already had a very potent counterterrorism 
apparatus, in fact, the anti-terrorism judges had even specialized in prosecuting Jihadi 
terrorists. In the decade following the 9/11 attacks, a total of five domestic security laws 
were passed. Many of the new counterterrorism provisions, similar to reforms in other 
Western countries, were designed to step up preventive powers, surveillance, and terrorism-
related criminal law provisions, as judicial checks continued to decline. Many of the reforms 
were also representative of the French way of tackling possible terrorism-crime connections 
by going after ordinary criminals and delinquents.  
 The 2012 Toulouse, 2014 Brussels, and 2015 Paris attacks triggered three additional 
counterterrorism laws. Not surprisingly, the 2012 and 2014 acts targeted foreign fighters; 
France is home to the largest group of Western foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq, with more 
than 800 individuals having left between 2012 and mid-2015.129 Among other things, the 
2012 Security Act130 increased punishment for the written, spoken, or pictorial incitement 
and glorification of terrorism. Visits to military or ideological training camps became 
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criminal offenses, as did the act of committing a terrorist offense abroad.  Displaying a 
familiar pattern, the 2014 law introduced new repressive measures, seeking to prevent, 
counter, and punish foreign fighter travel, lone wolfs, and internet recruitment.131 
Specifically, the law authorized counterterrorism authorities to confiscate passports and 
identity cards of French nationals, if there was “serious reason” to believe they were going to 
join a terrorist group or engage in terrorist activities. For the first time, individuals could be 
prosecuted for terrorist activities, as the law no longer assumed “association with others.” 
Counterterrorism services could block Internet sites deemed responsible for inciting or 
glorifying terrorism, and without having to seek judicial approval. Also directed against lone 
wolfs and online recruitment was a provision that criminalized the searching, attaining, and 
creating of materials that could be used in terrorist activities. As the latter two provisions 
illustrate, France not only targeted radical behavior but also cognitive radicalization.  
 Showing a familiar pattern and much in line with its security-oriented approach, the 
French government also boosted counterterrorism spending, personnel, and surveillance 
powers in the aftermath of the Charlie Hebdo attacks. According to Prime Minister Manuel 
Valls, counterterrorism funds will increase by 246 million euro in 2015 and an estimated 
total of 736 million euro by 2017. A total of 2,680 positions will be created, 1,400 of which 
in the Ministry of Interior, mostly in the area of domestic intelligence.132 Legislative reforms 
were implemented in May 2015, when the French parliament adopted a new 
administrative framework for intelligence collection involving wiretaps, keystroke logging, 
and internet and phone connection data.133 The law also required that intelligence 
collection in prisons, e.g. the monitoring of prison communications, be handled by 
intelligence services and no longer remain the responsibility of the prison administration.  A 
three-year national plan announced in April illustrated a further effort to go after cognitive 
radicalization. Based on the plan, among other things, racist and anti-Semitic behavior, hate 
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speech, and language on the Internet will be considered criminal offenses and trigger 
tougher prison sentences.134  
 
A Softer Approach  
 In January 2015 the French government also announced a few measures geared 
toward stopping and/or preventing Jihadi radicalization, mostly inside prisons. This was 
remarkable; not only did the French, as mentioned above, not recognize radicalization as a 
phenomenon that ought to be tackled separately, but they also did not invest in any soft 
measures until nine months earlier. The French approach to soft counterradicalization first 
started changing in 2013, with the White Paper on Defense and National Security citing 
the need to “develop government initiatives to combat radicalization,”135 and then-Prime 
Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault calling for a discussion about the “prevention of radicalization 
phenomena.”136 In response, the Interior Ministry presented its plan to “fight against 
radicalization” in spring 2014.137 Designed to destroy recruitment networks and prevent 
French citizens from joining the conflict in Syria, many assumed that the strategy was a 
half-hearted attempt by the government to respond to public pressure about growing foreign 
fighter streams. Insiders argue, however, that the policy shift was triggered by the 2012 
Merah attack.138 Be that as it may, the 2014 plan was of note because it was the first nation-
wide effort to tackle the “process of radicalization” and the “passage” to violence by means 
of soft measures. While addressing radicalization at the earliest stages, it also included an 
experimental program for reintegration. Similar to soft counterradicalization initiatives in 
other European countries, the plan evolved around a new national phone hotline and 
internet portal for “endangered” individuals, their families, or community members who 
could call the helpline to seek advice, submit a written form via the web portal, notify 
authorities, and also take advantage of tailored assistance programs at the local level. Local 
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support structures include prosecutors, mayors, police, schools, religious leaders, family 
foundations, youth and employment services, and are geared toward reintegrating and re-
socializing individuals, in particular teenagers.  
 The French phone hotline is arguably still security-oriented, especially when 
compared to its counterparts in countries such as Germany. A public-private partnership 
considered highly successful in reaching a large target group of affected families, the 
counseling network funded by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugee Affairs 
(BAMF) serves as an alternative to, and effectively replaced, the HATIF phone hotline run 
by the federal domestic intelligence service (the latter was considered ill-equipped to serve 
as a contact point for Muslim communities), although HATIF was designed as an individual 
deradicalization program and the BAMF counseling network focuses on the families of 
radicalized individuals. While the BAMF-run Counseling Center Radicalization represents 
the central point of contact for individuals in need, providing initial advising and screening, 
the cases are referred to one of four local NGOs responsible for professional counseling. 
Interventions at the family level are designed to have ideological, pragmatic, and emotional 
impact and lend support, by establishing counternarratives, breaking with behavioral 
activities, and offering emotional support systems. 
 In France, the ten staff members of the National Centre of Assistance and 
Prevention of Radicalisation, CNAPR (Centre National d’Assistance et de Prévention de la 
Radicalisation) are located at the Interior Ministry and receive training from Islam experts 
of the Anti-Terrorist Coordination Unit, UCLAT (Unité de Coordination de la Lutte Anti-
Terroriste), which also runs the hotline; they are experienced National Police reservists, 
assisted by two in-service police officers in charge of information screening and analysis, and 
a psychologist.139 Asked about the security approach to radicalization, UCLAT director 
Loïc Garnier emphasized that the hotline staff did not represent the police per se, but was 
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selected because of their many years of work and life experience, their “ability to listen and 
their emotional sensitivity.”140 Interestingly, the much anticipated June 2015 parliamentary 
commission report on radicalization called the center “a breakthrough because it allows the 
management of the associates of radicalized people and identification of problematic 
situations requiring follow-ups by the authorities.”141 
   
Countering Prison Radicalization 
 After the Charlie Hebdo attacks, the French government decided to focus on prison 
radicalization as well. The focus on prisons was not accidental: The radicalization 
trajectories of Mohamed Merah, Chérif Kouachi, and Amedy Coulibaly, the perpetrators of 
the 2012 Toulouse/Montauban and 2015 Paris attacks, were thought to have been 
significantly influenced by their prison experience. Chérif Kouachi met Coulibaly at the 
Fleury-Merogis prison, where the former was imprisoned from January 2005 to October 
2006. While Coulibaly served a sentence for drug trafficking and robbery and became 
radicalized while in prison, Chérif’s Jihadi convictions apparently hardened while serving a 
prison sentence for attempting to travel to an Iraqi terrorist camp. Merah, who shot dead 
seven people during a week-long shooting spree in 2012, also became radicalized while 
behind bars. Finally, French national Mehdi Nemmouche, accused of shooting four people 
at a Jewish museum in Brussels, became radicalized when serving a prison sentence for 
robbery.  
 Prime Minister Valls announced that to better counter radicalization inside French 
prisons “inmates who are deemed radicalized” would be isolated from common criminals 
and concentrated in special prisons.142 Separating radical prisoners from ordinary ones was 
already an option before, under the DPS (Détenu Particulièrement Signalé) procedure, but 
only implemented on an individual basis.143 Based on a pilot project involving twenty-three 
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prisoners at the prison of Fresnes (Val-de-Marne) that started in November 2014, four other 
prisons would be designated for radical prisoners only.144 In addition, fifty-five intelligence 
officers would join the prison bureaus.  Prison intelligence offices (Bureau du 
Renseignement Penitentiaire) were first set up in 2003, in an effort to keep tabs on inmate 
behavior and detect and control those who showed signs of social withdrawal from 
mainstream prison populations. The 2012 Merah attacks triggered a first set of reforms, 
when the prison administration signed an information sharing protocol with the Directorate-
General of Domestic Security, DGSI (Direction Générale de la Sécurité Intérieure), 
responsible for domestic intelligence collection. The DGSI also started training prison staff 
about “new issues of radical Islam.” After January 5, 2015, prison administration officials 
became detailed to the UCLAT and started participating in its weekly meetings.145 
 The decision to isolate radical prisoners has been criticized because there is a risk it 
might lead to “prison universities:”146  Increased group radicalization due to like-minded 
individuals located in the same space who will have opportunities to discuss their ideas, 
tactics, strategies, mistakes, and best practices.147 Separating the radicals from petty 
criminals, so Khosrokhavar warns, may prevent them from influencing others, but “it 
strengthens the bonds they have with each other.”148 They may also still indirectly 
influence “regular” prisoners who view them as victims. Moreover, petty criminals may also 
be radical, even if they have not been booked under terrorism charges, and still be able to 
proselytize, as the focus remains on those convicted on terrorism charges.149  Even though 
Justice Minister Christine Taubira has insisted that the isolated prisoners are also kept 
separate from each other, individual isolation may pose practical challenges as well.150 As is 
now well known, Djamel Beghal (while serving a ten year sentence for plotting to attack the 
U.S. embassy in Paris) played an important role in the prison radicalization of the Paris 
attackers, Chérif Kouachi and Amedy Coulibaly - even though Beghal was held in solitary 
  
 
 
Dorle Hellmuth: Countering Jihadi Radicals and Foreign Fighters in the United States and France: 
Très Similaire 
28 
Fall/15 
Nr. 4 
ISSN: 2363-9849         
confinement when communicating with them between 2003 and 2006.151 Others have 
cautioned that prison isolation should represent an instrument of last resort and only apply 
to the most radical inmates, especially in view of the growing numbers of returning foreign 
fighters.152 Not all of them return as hardened jihadists, but, to the contrary, often resemble 
disillusioned or even traumatized teenagers.153 Remarkably, the parliamentary commission 
on radicalization for the first time distinguished between three categories of returning 
fighters: the jihadist die-hards, requiring a judicial response and incarceration; the 
disillusioned and disappointed who did not commit any crimes, demanding de-
indoctrination and reintegration programs; and those traumatized by war and violence, in 
need of psychological therapy.154 
 The same report differentiates between three categories of prisoners that should 
come with different kinds of treatments: The radical converts, requiring isolation and 
regular transfers to “prevent further recruitment and dissemination of radical ideas on other 
prisoners;” for the radical non-converts, so the report notes, “it is conceivable to group them 
into dedicated areas by setting up dedicated de-radicalization programs;”  regarding the 
potential radicals, “it is recommended to spread them among the common criminals in 
ordinary sections” and put them under special intelligence observation.155 However, there is 
still a question as to whether those prisoners showing signs of radicalization should be held 
in the same prison structure or in isolation in various different institutions. The report 
presented lessons of the aforementioned pilot program in Fresnes, inter alia, which 
combined convicted prisoners and those charged with criminal conspiracy of committing 
terrorist offenses in a special prison wing. While the project helped stem proselytizing, the 
report acknowledges that “the experience of Fresnes must be rethought and improved,” 
especially with regard to the “choice of detainees, the combination of converts and 
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impressionable prisoners, the training of personnel, and the lack of deradicalization 
programs.”156 
 While the decision to isolate radical prisoners after the Paris attacks, as well as task 
professional intelligence services with keeping tabs on prison populations, fits with the 
overall security approach to radicalization, a related government initiative is noteworthy. In 
order “…to be effective,”  Prime Minister Valls noted, “the (prison) isolation must go hand in 
hand with … a review of the conditions under which imams are recruited and trained.”157 
Not only is their training supposed to improve, but the number of prison imams to increase 
by sixty.  This is done in an effort to prevent the spread of the Jihadi virus in the first place - 
a tremendous challenge since prison imams need to be qualified, modern enough to 
understand social media, and also willing and capable of engaging in political debates.158 
The focus on prison imams is all the more remarkable as it represents an effort to bolster the 
softer elements of the French counterradicalization campaign, thus far centered on the 
national phone helpline (in combination with local initiatives that are initiated through the 
hotline).  
 At least 50% of the 66,761159 prison inmates in France are Muslim; they were 
assisted by a total of 182 imams in 2014, compared to 681 Catholic and 70 Jewish 
chaplains.160 The lack of Muslim chaplains is thought to have created a vacuum that leaves 
room for self-appointed and self-taught imams and their radical ideas.161 France did increase 
the number of prison imams in 2009 and 2010, and introduced new vetting and training 
programs to ensure that imam teachings are compatible with French values, as imams “made 
in France” are considered the best way of spreading moderate Islam.162 The role of the 
prison imams was also scrutinized and discussed in the aftermath of both the 2012 and 2014 
attacks163 and a total of thirty were added in 2012 and 2013.164 However, the status of the 
prison imams has not been elevated or professionalized, a fact that will continue to 
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undermine their overall caliber. In June 2014, Hassan el-Anoui Talibi, chief prison imam in 
France, called for an official status for prison chaplains, similar to that of hospital and 
military chaplains. Currently, prison imams are merely reimbursed for their travel 
expenses,165 and even though the budget for Muslim chaplains will be doubled it will not 
cover salaries, pensions, or health benefits.166 While these kinds of public benefits are not 
available for Catholic prison chaplains either, the latter collect financial aid through the 
Catholic Church, which is also responsible for their training. Finding qualified and 
moderate imams does not only represent financial challenges, however; the verification of 
imam qualifications remains problematic as Islam does not require a standardized education 
for its spiritual leaders. Prison imams are volunteers, but do not receive any mandatory 
training which would “provide status by professionalizing the function, as already exists in 
the army.”167  
 Increasing the number of qualified prison imams is considered an essential step and 
so is the integration of other services as part of a holistic, interdisciplinary approach to 
radicalization. According to Ouisa Kies, prison administration director of the detection and 
supervision of radical inmates program, “new forms of radicalization cannot be dealt with 
unless a close cooperation is established between the various professionals involved in the 
prison administration (prison counselors and probation officers, intelligence officers, 
schools, doctors, psychologists, etc.).” 168 A system-wide, interdisciplinary approach becomes 
imperative also due to the unique French perspective on laïcité: Kies explains that 
“chaplains are essential partners in the administration, but we cannot imagine a secular 
republic meeting a social problem only by means of religion.”169  
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Tres Similaire: Comparing French and U.S. Approaches 
 The preceding analysis of French and U.S. counterradicalization strategies and 
programs illustrates important similarities. These come as somewhat of a surprise, as the two 
Western democracies represent distinctly different political systems and cultures. The U.S. 
separation of power and federal system is designed to restrain executive power, whereas the 
French semi-presidential system facilitates and concentrates power in the hands of the 
French President and in Paris. While the French counterterrorism regime has been studied 
and admired by many U.S. scholars and policymakers, this praise typically comes with the 
caveat that most of the French methods would not be feasible or acceptable by American 
legal standards, such as “granting highly intrusive powers to … (an) internal security service 
... and to … counterterrorist investigative magistrates,” thereby combining the “powers of 
prevention, deterrence and punishment in one individual.”170  
 Yet, similarities abound. Both countries got a late start on counterradicalization. The 
reasons for this are different, but in both cases the shifts in perspective were triggered by an 
increase in Jihadi violence. The Obama administration started changing the U.S. approach 
in response to an increase in Jihadi plots and attacks in 2009; the Hollande government 
began addressing radicalization after the 2012 Merah attacks and in the context of the 
growing number of French foreign fighters leaving for Syria and Iraq.  
 Most strikingly, both countries adopted a security-centric approach to 
counterradicalization; they have focused on repressive and judicial measures, which are 
facilitated by potent and preventive counterterrorism tools and supported by conspiracy 
and material support clauses. Neither France nor the U.S. reintegrate returning foreign 
fighters who either are taken directly into custody and prosecuted, or else put under 
surveillance and arrested at a later point.171 Softer counter- and deradicalization measures 
have remained on the backburner. They are still vague, improvised, and sporadic in the 
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U.S., where there has been a focus on research and community engagement. They are still 
marginalized in France, where the number of prison imams remains small, their status 
unchanged, and the UCLAT in charge of the national helpline. However, in both countries 
they are slowly increasing in number and scope.   
 To be sure, French and U.S. responses differ as well. The French approach to 
counterradicalization goes further, as France’s national phone helpline allows for 
deradicalization and prevention at the grassroots level. In France, there is also more of a 
multi-disciplinary focus and emphasis on involving other, non-security oriented government 
agencies, “while in the United States even the debate on the matter (involving segments of 
government other than law enforcement) is very much law enforcement-based,”172 since 
violent extremism involves violent crimes that need to be stopped.173 The U.S. stopped 
short of an actual national plan, and while the emphasis has been on building trust, engaging 
and supporting local communities so they can help themselves against radicals, there is no 
concrete, nation-wide mechanisms for deradicalization or preventive intervention (unless 
individuals are turning to violence). Recently, however, attempts at deradicalization have 
begun taking shape at the local level, as the examples in Minnesota and Colorado illustrate.  
 In addition, France has a very different take on cognitive radicalization and passed 
various laws that tackle radical language, speech, and images. As this would be unthinkable 
due to U.S. constitutional freedom of speech protections, the U.S. government focuses on 
violent actions, behaviors and uses FBI-orchestrated agent provocateurs. The official U.S. 
term for counterradicalization, “countering violent extremism,” is representative of this 
actionable focus as well.174 Contrary to the French and other European countries, the U.S. 
government does not seek to counter radicalization per se but violent extremism, which 
places the focus on unlawful action as opposed to radical thinking.        
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 The choice of terminology and hands-off approach evinced in the U.S. strategy are 
indicative of other factors. It is precisely, as the strategy also notes, because “the American 
social fabric continues to weave together waves of immigrants to the United States and 
people from all backgrounds and walks of life,” 175 that an ideological debate addressing the 
root causes of Jihadi radicalization has not taken place. According to Pandith, the “U.S. 
government has struggled to wage a “war of ideas”” and is still missing this very important 
“soft power” dimension.176 In a nation of immigrants of all races, ethnicities, and religions, 
there is a heightened cultural sensitivity, a reluctance to single out particular groups or 
segments of society, and an emphasis on political correctness and inclusiveness (the latter, 
ironically, ends up undermining the very notion of freedom of speech). In fact, domestic 
criticism has been growing that the media and congressional focus on Jihadi violence is 
exaggerated, also because right-wing terrorists have killed more people in the United States 
since 9/11 than Jihadists.177 Because Jihadi radicalization is connected to a particular 
religion, this further raises questions of how the government can and should get involved; 
the U.S. version of secularism, the separation of church and state concept, prohibits 
government interference in all religious affairs.  
 Of course, the French interpretation of secularism also influences the French way of 
countering Jihadi radicalization. Because laïcité seeks to prevent religious encroachment 
into the public sphere and does not allow religious matters to dominate the policy response, 
there is a need for multi-disciplinary programs in the counterradicalization realm (even if 
they have been slow in coming). At the same time, the commitment to French republican 
secular values makes the consideration of other counterradicalization choices more 
challenging. A recent report by a former French government official emphasized the need to 
include moderate Muslim elites and especially religious ones as part of governmental 
counterradicalization efforts - to help prevent Muslim communities from feeling 
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stigmatized.178 The report further criticized that the government office of organized 
religions (bureau centrale des cultes) remains part of the security-minded Interior Ministry, 
as Muslim representatives working with the government are often considered “deputy-
sheriffs” by their community. “In the absence of a political response to growing islamist 
fundamentalism,” so the report summarized, “various administrations have opted for a 
security-focused response to its terrorist manifestation.”179 However, the ideological debate 
in France is slowly emerging. While the government has proactively promoted French 
republication values for years, it recently invested in a more direct ideological exchange and 
war of ideas. A website, called “Stop-jihadism,” is supposed to give families and relatives of 
vulnerable individuals new tools and arguments for challenging the Jihadi ideology. The 
government platform posts documents and videos to offer a counter-narrative to the Jihadi 
perspective, mostly in an effort to prevent online recruitment of foreign fighters.180 While 
the site has been accessed more than two million times since its creation in January 2015, it 
is not clear how effective it can be. At the very least, it “cannot be the sole response to the 
problem of media jihad” because the “voice of the state struggles” to be heard. “To be more 
effective,” so the parliamentary commission report notes, the dialogue must be led by 
“associations or respected public figures young people can relate to.”181 The commission 
thus called for the creation of a non-state foundation that can feature videos of victims and 
their families, former extremists, religious leaders, or well-known public figures as part of 
another website. They would be able to use more relevant, offbeat, and direct language, and, 
according to the commission, should also include religion as part of their dialogue. “The 
religious aspect should not be taboo or prohibited in the name of laïcité. … we need a 
discourse on values and visions of our society and the world. The presence of theological 
aspects in the jihadist movement shows that there is need for a theological 
counterdiscourse” or narrative.182 
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 Furthermore of note, in September 2015 France announced a deradicalization pilot 
program that will start in the Alsace region and is based on the Danish Aarhus model. The 
program is subject to judicial oversight and attempts to reintegrate select individuals 
convicted of offenses connected to radical Islam (not involving terrorist acts). The 
integration process will be managed by “psychologists, educators and social workers.” It 
includes the restoring of social ties and ideological debate but no religious dimension,183 as 
the “religious aspect” is not considered “central to the phenomenon of radicalization.”184 
According to the parliamentary commission, “the goal of a de-radicalization center would be 
to instill a vision of their religion compatible with the values of the Republic, to accompany 
them and help them reintegrate in society, permitting them to develop a personal and 
professional project.”185 Similarly, the religious dimension is absent at the phone hotline 
center; it also relies on providing social and psychological support, as the “phenomenon of 
radicalization has nothing to do with religion,” according to Prefect Pierre N’Gahane, but 
everything with a sense of “failure,” experiencing a “break with the environment,” and “a 
search for meaning and identity. They could cling to anything” in these existential crises:186 
“a cult, suicide, army or drug.”187 “The strength of the jihadist discourse is that it gives 
answers. …It is our responsibility to offer them an alternative solution.”188 
 In conclusion, it is important to note that counterradicalization strategies and 
(especially) deradicalization programs in France and the United States are not only 
comparatively new but also necessarily evolving and adjusting to an ever changing threat. 
The French parliamentary commission thus drew attention to the changing profile of the 
Syrian foreign fighters, which in 2012 and 2013 left to fight the Assad regime and are now 
departing “to achieve a prophecy, with eschatological dimensions.”189 Even before the most 
recent Jihadi-inspired shootings in Garland, Texas, and Chattanooga, Tennessee, in May 
and July 2015,190 the House of Representatives’ Homeland Security Committee held 
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nearly monthly hearings on violent extremism and foreign fighters in 2015. Highly 
publicized attacks in Toulouse and Brussels and unprecedented foreign fighter numbers led 
France to frame a first response to Jihadi radicalization in 2014, and further intensify these 
efforts after the Charlie Hebdo attacks in January 2015, which were followed by the June 
attack at a gas factory in Isère (leaving one person decapitated and two injured) and the 
August plot on a French commuter train. Calling repressive measures “insufficient” when 
countering the threat posed by religious radicalization,191 the parliamentary commission 
report contained thirty-seven concrete proposals devoted to deradicalization and softer 
measures. The report also emphasized that - since France was facing an unprecedented 
threat that “can strike anyone, anywhere and anytime” - it is essential to have a strong first 
response that builds on intelligence services and judicial counterterrorism capacities, but 
then noted that, “we are not only facing a security issue but rather a societal challenge. The 
answer must be holistic”192 and be part of a long-term approach. A non-issue until a few 
years ago, the challenges posed by homegrown Jihadi radicalization have become 
mainstream topics in both countries, and will arguably remain high on the political agendas 
in Paris and Washington DC. 
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